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SLEIGHT OF HAND
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY*
INTRODUCTION
Learned Hand was a titan of American law: incisive in his
intelligence, capacious in his knowledge, decidedly pragmatic in his
judgment, but intellectually sophisticated through and through.1
Although unafraid of touching broader themes in his decisions and
his writings, he was, at the end of the day, most comfortable as a
judge. When pressed toward moral abstraction, Learned Hand dug
in his heels as the hard-headed skeptic. Unsurprisingly, Learned
Hand's opinions have cast a long intellectual shadow in a fundamen-
tal subject like tort law. Indeed, the "Hand Formula" of United
States v. Carroll Towing Co.2 is perhaps the most central idea of
many first-year torts classes today.3 Students learn that the
standard of care in negligence law is ideally-if somewhat
abstractly-analyzed in terms of a formula comparing the costs of
taking precautions, with the product of the likelihood of injury
without those precautions, and the magnitude of such injury.4
There is more than a little irony, however, in the superstar status
of the Hand Formula in torts. To begin with, Carroll Towing is not
* Professor and James H. Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law School. Thanks
to Fordham University for research support. I am grateful to Tom Baker, Mark Geistfeld,
John Goldberg, Michael M. Martin, Arthur Ripstein, Anthony Sebok, Catherine Sharkey,
Ken Simons, Joseph Sweeney, Ernest Weinrib, participants in a Fordham workshop, and to
organizers and participants in the William and Mary Conference on Law and Morality for
helpful conversations on this Article. The ideas of the Article connect, in my view, quite
closely with my ongoing research projects with John Goldberg on the nature of negligence
law and tort law more generally. All errors here are my own.
1. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).
2. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
3. See Patrick J. Kelley, The Carrol Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law,
45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 731, 733 (2001).
4. See id.
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a negligence case at all; indeed, it is not even a tort case, but an
admiralty case.5 Beyond that, the allegedly unreasonable conduct
in that case involved a plaintiffs carelessness, not a defendant's
carelessness;' even the very general idea of a wrongdoer being
held responsible to those it has injured is not implicated in
Carroll Towing, because the case is about a plaintiffs fault.' And
in Carroll Towing and the relatively few other decisions in which
Hand commented on what is now termed the "Hand Formula," he
took great pains to caution readers against elevating the idea to a
magical formula and to warn them against the possibility of
anything approaching precise application.' Add to this that Hand
was quite self-consciously a federal appellate judge operating
largely in a state with its own well developed tort law in a post-Erie
era,9 and one can easily see that Hand would not have claimed-and
did not claim-for his algebraic formula anything like the centrality
it is now claimed to have.
How could the Hand Formula have become elevated to the high
status it now enjoys in tort theory? The obvious answer is "Richard
Posner." The leading torts professor in the country for decades, and
now the leading writer of torts opinions on the bench, Posner
launched the most illustrious phase of his remarkable academic
career by seizing upon the Hand Formula as the key to negligence
law. And he has never let go. Posner's most famous article, A Theory
of Negligence, used Hand's decision in Carroll Towing as the
starting point for what he touted to be a clear-sighted and correct
analysis of negligence law.1° Moreover, because a twinkling of
5. See id. at 171-73.
6. In the language of admiralty law at that time, the carelessness at issue was that of
the "libellant," who sought compensation for damages, not the "respondent," from whom
compensation was sought.
7. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 172 ("[I]t was a failure in the Conner Company's proper
care of its own barge.... For this reason the question arises whether a barge owner is slack in
the care of his barge if the bargee is absent.").
8. See Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 162-80 (2003) (giving an account of the other cases in which
Judge Hand applied his balancing framework and highlighting Hand's reluctance to elevate
the formula to a magical status).
9. See id.
10. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972); see also
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85-88
(1987).
2000 [Vol. 48:1999
SLEIGHT OF HAND
algebra and efficiency lurks in Carroll Towing, Professor Posner
used the case to energize his entire economic theory of tort law,
which, in my view, remains the most celebrated within the legal
academy.
Indeed, the Hand Formula as an interpretation of the standard
of care in negligence law, in some ways, surpasses the celebrity of
Posner's particular economic interpretation of it. Law professors and
casebook authors who strive to take a pluralistic or middle-of-the-
road approach toward tort theory are frequently happier to teach
the Hand Formula as the core of negligence than they are to
embrace any highly monetized form of it." The Third Restatement
of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm expressly embraces a version
of the Hand Formula, but stops short of a fully economic interpreta-
tion of it. 2 Although Posner's selection of efficiency over utility
remains highly controversial, he appears to have won over a large
audience with his broader claim that the standard of care in
negligence law should be understood in terms of the Hand Formula
and that, moreover, the deterrence-based account of negligence law
that flows from such an analysis provides a systematic account of
the entirety of negligence doctrine. Although the Hand Formula
analysis of negligence certainly has seen its share of detractors, it
is an analytical doctrine that has tended to cut across political and
ideological lines.' 3 As the work of Heidi Hurd, Michael Moore, and
numerous philosophers of tort law illustrates, the Hand Formula
has cut across divisions within the legal academy, too.
14
The allure of the Hand Formula is, I am afraid, all smoke and
mirrors; it is Posner's sleight of Hand. To be sure, there are many
contexts in which it is intelligent and reasonable, in thinking about
which precautions to take, to consider precaution costs, probabilities
11. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN, & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 45-49 (8th ed. 2006); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
13. For example, contrast Posner's openly conservative approach with the Rawlsian
approach of Keating. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence 7eory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 332-36 (1996) (adopting social contract inter-
pretation of the Hand Formula).
14. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 333, 359-60 (2002).
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of injuries, and magnitude of injuries. It is also true, all else being
equal, that the reasons against taking the precaution tend to
increase with its cost, whereas the reasons in favor of the precaution
tend to increase with the reduction of injury likelihood or severity
that the precaution would effect. Almost no one contests that. But
this is a far cry from showing that the concept of negligence or due
care in American negligence law means failing to take cost-justified
precautions. There is plenty of content to the concept of negligence
in our common law of negligence, and for the most part, it does not
relate to cost-justified precautions. Over the past sixteen years, the
weakness of the Hand Formula's account of the standard of care has
been displayed by Patrick Kelley, 5 Stephen Gilles, 6 Gregory
Keating,"v Richard Wright," Michael Green, 9 Heidi Feldman, ° and
numerous others.2'
In this Article, I shall try to push this case further, contending
that the claim that the Hand Formula captures the meaning of
negligence is belied by several fundamental features of negligence
law. Beyond showing that the Hand Formula is, as Richard Wright
15. See Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of
Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 315, 343-44 (1990); Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt,
What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 587, 591 (2002).
16. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 816-21 (2001) [hereinafter
Gilles, On Determining Negligence]; Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA.
L. REv. 1015 (1994).
17. See Keating, supra note 13, at 328-32.
18. See Wright, supra note 8, at 162-80; Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care in
Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 249, 250-55 (David G. Owen
ed., 1995) [hereinafter Wright, The Standards of Care].
19. See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1605, 1642-43 (1997).
20. See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1431 (2000).
21. Other important contributions to this literature include those by Jules Coleman, John
Goldberg, Steve Hetcher, Stephen Perry, Arthur Ripstein, Kenneth Simons, Martin Stone,
Ernest Weinrib, and Catherine Pierce Wells. Unlike the other authors cited in the
aforementioned list, Gilles and Green continue to believe that, so long as the Hand Formula
is not interpreted in a Posnerian economic manner, it continues to have a central role in
understanding breach. As will be made clear below, I believe that the evidence that has been
mounted, in part by these scholars themselves, points toward a far more skeptical conclusion
on the role of the Hand Formula.
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has called it, a "myth,"22 I shall begin to sketch an affirmative
theory of the concept of ordinary care in American negligence law.
Needless to say, the sleight of hand I am attributing to Posner is
not duplicitous or dishonest, because the magician himself was
tricked. I have no doubt that Posner believed that reasonable care
must be understood in terms of the Hand Formula. The problem is
that Posner's contempt for morally tinged accounts of legal language
is so profound that he cannot see the moral language as a real
option.23 This is presumably what Posner came to realize when he
began talking about "overcoming law."24 He began to recognize,
more clearly, that he is in a bind, wondering whether there is really
law for him to see, because his reductive accounts of what the law
says are implausible, and he refuses to countenance those versions
of the law that take its surface language seriously. Posner's radical
philosophical skepticism about the normative language of the law
blinds him to what the law says. He is, to this extent, taken in by
his own sleight of hand. If I am right that Posner's philosophical
skepticism about moral language and robust concepts in the law is
indefensible, a position that I have argued at length elsewhere,25
then neither he nor others should be taken in. Breach in negligence
law is to be judged by the ordinary care standard, and no evidence
exists that either our system or the jurors who make these decisions
are led to, or do, understand this standard in terms of the Hand
Formula.
One more irony. Looking back at A Theory of Negligence, Posner
apparently was attacking an academic program that made him
deeply suspicious. Posner saw in what he called the "orthodox view
of the negligence concept" a fashionable if deeply rooted trend in the
legal academy that was getting in the way of clear thinking about
negligence law. 26 He sought to look at the body of actual tort cases
22. Wright, supra note 8, at 145.
23. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637, 1693-98 (arguing that moral legal language does not justify an account of law
based on morality).
24. RIcHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
25. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND.
L. REv. 1, 93-94 (1998).
26. Posner, supra note 10, at 29-32, 30 nn. 1-2. Calabresi's critique of negligence law is a
major antagonist of Posner's in this article. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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to undermine this way of thinking.2" He particularly thought taking
the concept of "negligence" seriously critical, because the idea of
holding defendants to a standard of conduct was, in his view, plainly
essential to what was happening in American tort law, notwith-
standing an academic attitude of dismissiveness toward it.28 And he
identified as a cause of the problem legal scholars' concerns that the
language of negligence was too "moralistic."29 Posner thought it
critical for law professors to get over the embarrassment, if you will,
of the moralizing language of negligence law, and to realize that the
language is not just verbiage or judgmentalism; it was really doing
work in the law. Of course, that is just my point here, and in what
follows.
Part I begins with the two pieces of writing I have already
mentioned: Hand's famous opinion in Carroll Towing, and Posner's
seminal article, A Theory of Negligence. The central point of Part I
is to contrast the difference between the relatively modest role the
Hand Formula plays in Carroll Towing, and the tremendous
analytical and theoretical significance attributed to it by Posner.
More particularly, Part II shows that Posner relies on the Hand
Formula as an analysis of the meaning of the standard of care in
negligence law.
Part II.A offers the central critical argument of the Article: the
Hand Formula simply fails to capture an abundance of evidence law
in the concept of negligence. The evidence consists in the jury
instructions given across the country, namely, the commonality of
words and concepts in those jury instructions, and their tendency to
refer to particular, overlapping concepts-that of ordinary care and
reasonable prudence or carefulness-that do not bear any particular
conceptual connection to the Hand Formula;3 ° the existence of a
wide and important range of cases that pertain to inadvertent
negligence, in a manner that makes little room for the applicability
of the Hand Formula; ' the existence of a spectrum of care levels in
27. Posner, supra note 10, at 34-36.
28. Id. at 29-32.
29. Id. at 31.
30. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 618-22.
31. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 931-33
(2001) (discussing the Draft Restatement's "endorsement of the reasonable person test for
2004 [Vol. 48:1999
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negligence law that are of a similar kind, but different stringency,
than ordinary care, but make little sense as contrasted with the
Hand Formula; 2 the continuity between breach standards in
nonprofessional negligence law and standards in a variety of other
corners of negligence law, including professional malpractice, and
the anomalousness of those standards relative to the Hand For-
mula;33 and the conceptual interdependence of breach and duty, in
a manner that the Hand Formula cannot explain. Although many
of these pieces of the picture have been brought out in prior work,
both that of others and of my own, they have not, to my knowledge,
been adequately integrated into a sustained critique of the Hand
Formula as an interpretation of the standard of care. Part II.B
explains why, notwithstanding the evidence that the Hand Formula
does not at all capture the standard of care in negligence law, one
nevertheless finds some courts using the Hand Formula to think
about negligence and doing so appropriately. Together, Parts II.A
and II.B establish that, although the Hand Formula is sometimes
helpful in thinking about breach, the statement that the Hand
Formula captures the meaning of negligence in tort law is false.
Part III explains why it matters that the Hand Formula fails to
capture the meaning of negligence. First, it has been the centerpiece
of the most important positive theory of negligence law; if the
centerpiece is gone, that casts serious doubt on the whole project.
Second, many policy debates about the appropriateness of a
negligence scheme versus a strict liability scheme presume that a
negligence scheme proceeds in accordance with the Hand Formula.
Because the presumption is false, the soundness of the evaluations
is undercut. Third, law professors and the American Law Institute
have frequently advocated various sorts of structural changes in
negligence law, on the ground that certain aspects of the law are
incoherent in light of the centrality of the Hand Formula.34 These
critical and revisionary arguments are also unsound, at least on
that ground, if the Hand Formula does not in fact occupy a central
cases of inadvertent negligence").
32. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 659 (1998).
33. See id. at 684-88.
34. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 31, at 925-39.
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role. Finally, the allegedly entrenched place of the Hand Formula in
American negligence law has led many lawyers to assert the proper
place of cost-benefit analysis in individual and governmental
decisionmaking. Perhaps the Hand Formula is normatively
laudable, but one cannot adopt it because of its special place in
negligence law; it has no such special place.
Parts IV and V indulge, if only briefly, the quip that "you need a
theory to beat a theory." I do not believe that the refutation of the
assertion that the Hand Formula captures the meaning of "negli-
gence" requires some other theory. The common law contains many
ideas that are understood but not deeply theorized. On the other
hand, I realize that readers are inevitably looking for something to
fill the void. For this reason, Part IV reviews many of the most
important non-Hand theories of negligence: rights-based and
corrective-justice accounts, conventionalist accounts, and accounts
based on virtue theory. All have significant strengths and weak-
nesses as interpretations of the concept of negligence or due care in
negligence law.
Part V sketches a theory called the "civil competency" theory of
negligence. This theory aims to combine the strengths of rights-
based, conventionalistic, and virtue-based theories, while avoiding
their weaknesses. Its basic idea is that the ordinary care standard
relies upon a conception of a person with a certain attribute- that
of being reasonably prudent-in terms of which what is negligent is
to be judged. The attribute of reasonable prudence is not, however,
a virtue or an excellence; negligence law does not shoot so high.
Reasonable prudence is more like a basic competency than a virtue,
more like being a competent driver than an excellent driver.
Because negligence law covers an extraordinarily broad range of
conduct, not simply one activity, the competency demanded of
persons in society is more amorphous and difficult to characterize.
It involves having the capacity and disposition to conduct oneself in
a manner that is not likely to cause injury to others, and, more
broadly, in a manner that takes seriously the security of others.
That is why it may be thought of as a civil (or civic) competency; it
is part of an ability to operate as part of a civil society.
2006 [Vol. 48:1999
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I. CARROLL TOWING, THE HAND FACTORS, AND POSNER'S
CONTENTION
The central contention of this Article is that it is false that the
standard of care in negligence law means failing to take B when B
is less than P times L.3" In asserting this, I do not mean to say that
B, P, and L could never have any relevance to thinking about
whether a breach has occurred. I am happy to recognize that B, P,
and L are frequently relevant to deciding breach, and that when
they are relevant, breach is more likely as B diminishes and less
likely as P and L diminish. Indeed, insofar as Carroll Towing
genuinely relied on an analysis of the role of B, P, and L in reason-
ableness analysis, it is a point about variability, and nothing more.
That is, in a way, the point of Hand's own discussion, as the
following brief analysis indicates.
Carroll Towing was an appeal of a lower court's determination
that (1) the owner of the Anna C, the Conners Company, may
recover the costs of damages from the owner and charterer of the
tug that caused the barge to break loose;a" and (2) the Conners
Company's recovery should not be diminished on account of its
alleged failure to have the bargee on board at the time the barge
broke loose.37 Judge Hand's focus was on (2). The owner of the tug,
Carroll Towing Company, and the charterer of the tug, Grace Lines,
from whom the Conners Company sought recovery, argued in return
that the Conners Company's failure to keep a bargee on board was
fault; consequently, they argued (under a precursor of today's
comparative negligence, which existed even then in admiralty law),
the Conners Company could not recover fully from them even if,
35. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("Since there are
occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes
a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if
the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether
B is less than L multiplied by P: i. e., whether B < PL.").
36. See Conners Marine Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 66 F. Supp. 396, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
37. Id. at 398.
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arguendo, it could recover at all. 8 Insofar as Carroll Towing relates
to the topic of "negligence" at all, it is because it addresses the
question of whether the Conners Company's failure to have a bargee
on board was faulty so as to diminish their recovery in an admiralty
proceeding.39 Hand recognized that this decision was not really
about the care owed to others, but rather about whether "it was a
failure in the Conner [sic] Company's proper care of its own barge."4
Hand reasoned, however, that if a bargee's absence could be a
ground for liability to others in these circumstances, it could be a
ground for finding a failure in the Company's care for its own
barge." Hand then proceeded to analyze the issue in terms of
whether it could be a ground for liability to others.42
The Conners Company argued to District Judge Moscowitz that
many Second Circuit precedents had addressed the question of
whether it is a ground for liability not to have a bargee on board.43
And it asserted that the Second Circuit had decided the issue: the
bargee's absence is not a ground for liability." On the strength of
these precedents, the District Judge sided with the Conners
Company, and held that the bargee's absence could not count as
negligence.45 That determination by the District Judge was one of
the principal points of appeal against the Conners Company.
Judge Hand decided, as predecision memoranda reveal, that he
would reject the Conners Company's argument and reverse on this
point.46 Judge Chase apparently was inclined to affirm, in signifi-
cant part, because of reluctance to disturb the District Court's
determination, which he did not regard as sufficiently erroneous to
merit disruption.47 As Professor Gilles has observed, Hand seemed
interested in establishing that the District Court made an error of
38. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171.
39. Id. at 172-73.
40. Id. at 172.
41. Id. at 173.
42. Id.
43. See Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., The Hand Formula's Home
Port, in TORT STORIES 11, 18 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
44. Id.
45. Conners Marine Co. v. Pa. R. Co, 66 F. Supp. 396, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
46. In this Article, I rely on Gilles's accounts of the Hand documents from the Hand
archives. See Gilles, supra note 43, at 19-21.
47. Id. at 21.
2008 [Vol. 48:1999
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law by supposing a general rule existed against using the bargee's
absence as a reason for imposing liability.4" Hand therefore thought
it very important to recognize that the kind of issue in question was
not of the right sort for a bright-line rule.49 "It becomes apparent
why there can be no such general rule, when we consider the
grounds for such a liability.... [T]he owner's duty, as in other similar
situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three
variables ..... 0 Hand thus reasoned that, because the grounds varied
with B, P, and L, and B, P, and L varied depending on the factual
circumstances of each case, no hard and fast rule could work for
every case.8' He therefore rejected the conclusion by the lower court
judge that Second Circuit precedent determining no fault for
absence of the bargee in prior cases in other circumstances could
settle the issue here. Holding the barge fast with an absent bargee
was not sufficient as a matter of law: "it is not in all cases a
sufficient answer to a bargee's absence without excuse, during
working hours, that he has properly made fast his barge to a pier,
when he leaves her."52 When addressing the question, on these facts,
he determined that it was fault for the bargee to be absent in this
case.53 Notably, his decision that it was fault for the bargee to be
absent did not emerge from any consideration of B, P, and L; it
related instead to his suspicions based on the bargee's lying.54
Thus, in his own clever (though nonmisleading) legerdemain,
Hand used the variability of circumstances as a reason not to defer
to the lower court's decision that no basis existed for diminishing
the plaintiff's recovery in this admiralty case. He ascertained that
the lower court had ruled based on the misconception that there was
a general rule about the bargee's absence.55 Hand used the Hand
Formula to illustrate the point that whether a bargee's absence was
48. Id. at 22-23.
49. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 174.
54. See id. at 173-74 ("In the case at bar the bargee left at five o'clock in the afternoon of
January 3rd, and the flotilla broke away at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the following
day, twenty-one hours afterwards. The bargee had been away all the time, and we hold that
his fabricated story was affirmative evidence that he had no excuse for his absence.").
55. Gilles, supra note 43, at 22-23.
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a ground of liability would vary with (or inversely with) these three
factors, and therefore could not be a fixed rule. But in this case, the
question was not liability; it was not what care was due to others;
it was not even contributory negligence. The issue was actually
whether there was any basis of fault that the defendants could use,
under the doctrine of both-to-blame reductions in maritime law, to
diminish the plaintiff's recovery. 6 There is thus no particular
reason to believe that this decision should be probative of the
standard of care in the common law of negligence. And quite plainly,
there is no reason to think that it captures, or was intended to
capture, the meaning of "negligence" or the content of the concept of
negligence.
Now the question to ask about Posner in A Theory of Negligence"
is whether he intended to use the Hand Formula as an illustration
of a particular way to decide whether there was negligent conduct
in particular cases, or whether he was, more ambitiously, asserting
that this is what the negligence standard really means. The answer
is the latter. Posner describes Learned Hand's "famous formulation
of the negligence standard" as "one of the few attempts to give
content to the deceptively simple concept of ordinary care.""8 Judge
Hand, Posner suggests, "was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an
economic meaning of negligence."9 Moreover, he goes out of his way
to make clear that he is offering not only an account of negligence,
but an account of the term "negligent":
Because we do not like to see resources squandered, a judgment
of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for
it implies that there was a cheaper alternative to the accident.
Conversely, there is no moral indignation in the case in which
the cost of prevention would have exceeded the cost of the
56. See NICHOLASJ. HEALY& JOSEPH C. SWEENEY, THE LAW OFMARINE COLLISION 303-05
(1998). At the time Carroll Towing was decided, the rule in force was the federal maritime
common law rule of the U.S. Supreme Court in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S.
170, 177-78 (1854), which divided damages equally if the plaintiff and the defendant were
both to blame. In the context of Carroll Towing, in which the plaintiff had sought a 50/50 split
between two responsible defendants, the determination of some form of fault or blame on the
plaintiffs own part led to an equal three-way split of responsibility.
57. Posner, supra note 10.
58. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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accident. Where the measures necessary to avert the accident
would have consumed excessive resources, there is no occasion
to condemn the defendant for not having taken them."
Here, Posner is clearly pointing out that an advantage of under-
standing "negligence" or "failure to use reasonable care" as failure
to take cost-justified precautions is that it explains why these
terms have negative moral overtones: because we do have negative
judgments of wastefulness.
Carroll Towing is thus remarkably weak support for the claim
that Posner wants to draw from the Hand Formula: that negligence
means the failure to take cost-justified precautions. Richard Wright
and others have demonstrated that Hand's sprinkling of other
opinions mentioning or using the Hand Formula by no means make
up for this weakness."1 Though perhaps a bit dismissive to say so,
whether Posner's comments here on the moral connotations of
"negligence" are persuasive is not worth debating; as John Goldberg
has pointed out, they plainly are not.62 If there really is a kind of
moral indignation typically found behind the claim that someone
negligently injured another, the resentment of economic wasteful-
ness does not explain that indignation; it is much more a resent-
ment of persons who do not take others' needs seriously.6
So what supports the Hand Formula? Of course, as a rights-based
philosopher of law, I am tempted to say that rampant utilitarianism
and reductionistic thinking is the cause of this misconception.
Though there is more than a grain of truth in this, it is much too
facile an answer. A far more plausible view is that the Hand
Formula owes its popularity to a combination of two forces: one is
the impressiveness and broad doctrinal ambitions of Posner's
framework, and its capacity to retain some form of fault without
embracing the sort of moralism that Calabresi and others rejected;'
60. Id. at 33.
61. Wright's analysis of Hand's eleven opinions undercuts the possibility of rehabilitating
a central place for the Hand Formula in negligence law by reference to Hand's other work. See
Wright, supra note 8, at 162-80. Some of these cases, however, are negligence cases, and some
do involve claims that the defendant breached a duty of care. Yet none provides anything but
a hand-waving reference to the balancing metaphor. Id.
62. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 553 (2003).
63. See id.
64. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 26.
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a second is the judgment, firmly implanted in American legal
thought long prior to Posner, that the standard of care in negligence
law is captured by a balancing of risk, probability of loss, and
magnitude of loss. This idea was probably first derived from Henry
Terry's well known Harvard Law Review article on "Negligence,"65
and then placed by the American Law Institute into the First
Restatement of Torts;66 Hand was a cofounder of the American Law
Institute, and he quite deliberately incorporated an algebraic
variation of this idea in Carroll Towing. The balancing in some form
also recurs in the Second Restatement of Torts.67 Posner's move was
to use the recognition of this way of thinking about negligence and
turn it into an account of the meaning of negligence, building upon
what was already quite a fashionable way of thinking about
negligence in the legal academy. And pluralists, deterrence-
compensation thinkers, and many others who reject an economic
version of the Hand Formula continue to think of a B < PL concep-
tion of negligence law as capturing the core idea of what the
standard of care is in negligence law.6"
The central claim of the next Part-and really the central claim
of this Article-is that the very idea of the Hand Formula, economic
or noneconomic, is fundamentally ill-suited to capturing the
meaning of negligence in American tort law.
65. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915). For a brief discussion of
Terry's largely undocumented identity and history, see Green, supra note 19, at 1627 n.104;
see also Feldman, supra note 20, at 1441-43; Hurd & Moore, supra note 14 (indicating a
significantly greater complexity in Terry's own balancing framework than the Hand Formula
suggests).
66. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 291 (1934); see also Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v.
Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 883 (Neb. 1902) (discussing negligence in terms of the balance of
advantages and disadvantages of precaution while setting forth the reasonable and prudent
person standard). Both Green, supra note 19, at 1627-28 & nn.104-06, and Gilles, On
Determining Negligence, supra note 16, at 822-25, reached the conclusion that the Reporter
for the First Restatement of Torts-Francis Bohlen-was influenced by Terry and Warren
Seavey, and that he therefore implanted a roughly utilitarian unreasonableness of risk
analysis into the Restatement of Torts, notwithstanding its ungroundedness in the case law
at the time; Krayenbuhl was one of the few cases gesturing in this direction. See generally
Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1927).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965).
68. Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 31 (describing a "risk-benefit form of analysis"
embodied by the Hand Formula as "fundamental" to the law of negligence and reflecting the
widespread acceptance of the Hand Formula outside the law-and-economics movement).
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II. THE HAND FORMULA AND THE MEANING OF "NEGLIGENCE" IN
AMERICAN NEGLIGENCE LAW
The evidence on American law overwhelmingly fails to support
the claim that the "ordinary care" standard in American law is
generally applied by courts or jurors by application of the Hand
Formula, in economic or noneconomic form. But that claim is not
largely my concern in this Article. My aim is to scrutinize the
claim that the Hand standard gives the meaning of negligence in
American negligence law. As to that claim, too, I arrive at the
conclusion that the Hand Formula does not give the meaning of
negligence in American negligence law.
A. The Evidence Against the Claim that the Hand Formula
Captures the Meaning of "Negligence"
1. Words and Synonyms
The first thing to notice about the negligence standard of
American negligence law is that legal authority lies in the concept,
not in the precise verbal formulation. This observation can be
inferred in part from the fact that, although verbal formulations
carry authority because of the body that passed them in statutory
law, the opposite is generally true in the common law. It is the legal
principle inhering in the decided cases that carry authority, not any
particular utterance of a lawmaking authority. But in the case of
the reasonable care standard, which in some sense is central to
negligence law, the remarkable phenomenon is that courts switch
around a bit on the precise words they use. Nevertheless, as we
shall see, the various verbal formulations all look to be approximat-
ing to the same concept. That concept does not bear any obvious
semantic relationship to the Hand standard.
Kelley and Wendt's work on jury instructions, covering those
forty-eight states that have pattern jury instructions, provides
powerful support for this view." The following is a typical definition
69. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 594-95.
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of negligence in jury instructions, taken from New York Pattern
Jury Instructions:
Negligence is lack of ordinary care. It is a failure to use that
degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have used
under the same circumstances. Negligence may arise from doing
an act that a reasonably prudent person would not have done
under the circumstances, or, on the other hand, from failing to
do an act that a reasonably prudent person would have done
under the same circumstances.7 °
The following is from the State of Washington:
Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care. It is the doing
of some act which a reasonably careful person would not do
under the same or similar circumstances or the failure to do
some act that a reasonably careful person would have done
under the same or similar circumstances.71
Preliminarily, note that these instructions have at least four
aspects. The first is a linkage of "negligence" with some lack or
failure of care. Second is a description of what sort of care is lacking,
and relatedly, an expansion on how to think about that level of care.
The third is a reference to the way that lack of care must be
displayed: it must be roughly a failure to exercise the defined level
of care, a failure that can be done through acting or through failing
to act. Fourth is the relativization to the circumstances. All four
structural features appear in virtually all of the instructions.72
Moreover, all four are roughly the same in content in all of the
jurisdictions. First, negligence is about lack of care. Second, the care
level is defined both with an initial adjective (or adjectives), and by
reference to a type of person. Third, the instructions make clear that
the failure to exercise care can be displayed through action or
inaction. Fourth, they all particularize to circumstances.73
70. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CML 2:10 (3d ed. 1999). The canonical
citation for the proposition that "negligence is lack of ordinary care" is Vaughan v. Menlove,
132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (C.P. 1837).
71. 6 WASHINGTON PATrERN INSTRUCTION-CML 10.01 (5th ed. 2005).
72. See Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 595-612.
73. See id.
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Our interest for the moment-and the place where I wanted to
call attention to the existence of similar words-was in the second
aspect: the specification of care level through an adjective and by
reference to a kind of person.
The New York instruction quite clearly defines the care level as
"ordinary care"; note that the adjective is "ordinary," not "reason-
able." 4 That is true in most states, such as California, Michigan,
Illinois, and Virginia; 5 however, a few, like Alaska, Connecticut,
and Florida, use "reasonable";"6 and some, like Alabama, use
"ordinary or reasonable care," or give a trial judge an option to use
either."
When New York's instructions expound on what "ordinary care"
is, they state that it is the care that a "reasonably prudent" person
would use under the circumstances." Washington, like many other
states, uses the word "careful" instead of "prudent," thereby asking
jurors to think about the "reasonably careful" person. 9 Overwhelm-
ingly, jurisdictions use "reasonably prudent person" or "reasonably
careful person."' Scattered around are phrases "reasonable person"
or "ordinarily careful person" or "person of ordinary prudence" or
"reasonable and prudent person."8'
What is interesting here is that slightly different words and
phrases are used to circle around what the common law seems to
regard as the same basic idea: an idea of "ordinary care" that is to
be understood in terms of a person who exercises the care that a
reasonably careful person would. "Reasonably prudent" and
"reasonably careful" are meant to refer to a person who exercises
"ordinary care"; the idea is that such a person is quite prudent and
careful, at least reasonably so. "Reasonably" prudent or "reasonably"
careful under the circumstances would seem to mean something less
than an extremely high level of care, though still a responsible adult
level of care. But remember, this is an expansion of "ordinary care."
And so the idea is that there is a kind of figure--the reasonably
74. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCIONS-CIVIL 2:10 (4th ed. 2006).
75. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 595 & nn.23-24.
76. Id. at 596-97 & nn.30-34.
77. Id. at 625 app.
78. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 2:10 (3d ed. 1999).
79. 6 WASHINGTON PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 10.01 (2005).
80. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 596 & nn.25-29.
81. Id. at 597, 607, 609.
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careful person-whom we regard as a standard, and this "standard"-
setting person exemplifies a kind of norm, a norm of "ordinary care."
Three points emerge from this discussion. First, there is a concept
here: this is not just a shell; they would not be hovering with almost
synonymous phrases around a shell. Second, the concept is one our
system communicates-and apparently conceives of-as derivative
of a prototypical figure. That our negligence standard is defined by
reference to the reasonably prudent person is, of course, a well-
known fact about the common law of negligence, although it is often
ignored. Third, despite the fact that there is plenty of language and
plenty of consistency in the language, and a particular concept is
being referred to, there is no hint that this concept, as a concept, has
anything whatsoever to do with the Hand Formula. Remember, my
point is not to address whether a reasonably prudent person ought
to employ the Hand standard, or even whether the courts think this
about the reasonably prudent person. The point is that our law does
not put the Hand standard into the concept of negligence itself,
because the concept of negligence is defined by something concrete,
and that something-the reasonably prudent person-simply does
not contain the idea of risk/utility balancing.
Curiously, American pattern jury instructions overwhelmingly
use formulations that differ slightly from what torts casebooks and
torts professors imagine is the prevailing, nonbalancing instruction:
the "reasonable person" standard. As Kelley and Wendt point out,
only five jurisdictions appear to use a "reasonable person" standard
in their pattern instructions: Maryland, Minnesota, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Hawaii. 2 The overwhelming majority of those that use
a derivative of "reasonableness" (which is itself the great majority),
define "negligence" or "ordinary care," as discussed above, in terms
of the "reasonably prudent" or "reasonably careful" person, not the
"reasonable" person." An examination of Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks Co.,' the Lord Alderson opinion famously introducing
the "reasonable man" standard, strongly suggests that it would be
a mistake to infer from this difference an intention to focus on
"reasonableness" as a form of rationality, rather than as an effort to
82. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 597 & nn.33 & 35, apps. at 638, 648, 651,671,677.
83. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
84. 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. 1856).
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designate a mid-level, moderate form of sensible carefulness and
caution. "Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."8 And the
factual context of Blyth again indicates that the whole point is that
ordinary or reasonable prudence is needed, and not extraordinary
prudence. In Blyth the court rejected plaintiffs effort to have
liability imposed upon defendant waterworks company for failing to
anticipate an extraordinarily cold winter, which caused its pipes to
freeze; its guarding against weather in the usual range was
sufficient prudence.'
2. Kinds of Cases, Including Inadvertence
Second, negligence law contains many kinds of cases in which the
question of whether the defendant was negligent is easily asked and
answered, and yet the analytical framework of the Hand standard
seems plainly inapplicable. The most obvious category, which a
number of scholars have now recognized, is the category of inadver-
tent negligence. Two hypotheticals illustrate this category. First, in
Patron v. Waiter, Waiter is in a restaurant and accidentally spills
hot soup on Patron, burning him and ruining his suit. Second, in
Pedestrian v. Driver, Driver rounds a corner awkwardly, skidding off
the road and into Pedestrian.
In both of these hypotheticals, the plaintiff will assert that the
defendant was negligent, and the judge will instruct the members
of the jury that they need to decide whether the defendant used
ordinary care. The jury will understand just what they are supposed
to decide, and they will listen to all the facts and then make their
decision. In thinking about whether the defendant used ordinary
care, the jury will not be deciding whether the defendant took cost-
justified precautions. The jury will be deciding whether the act of
defendant that injured her-the spilling of the soup in one case and
the skidding off the road in the other-was a careless act. And they
will do it by asking themselves to compare the defendant's conduct
85. Id. at 1049 (Alderson, B.).
86. Id. at 1048.
2007] 2017
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
to the reasonably prudent or careful person under the circum-
stances.
The general problem is that a great deal of negligence does not
involve taking unreasonable risks. It simply involves acting in a
manner that is careless. The negligence in these cases is in the
execution of the course of conduct or the act, not in the taking of a
risk. The Hand standard pertains only to unreasonable risk-taking.
It is tempting to suppose that the problem must be that the
waiter was carrying too many plates, or failing to look where he was
going; or perhaps he permitted himself to go to sleep too late the
night before and therefore was too tired to perform optimally. The
risk of carrying too many plates, of neglecting to look ahead in his
path, or of being too tired to perform competently at work-these
are truly the unreasonable risks taken, on such a view.87
This response is wholly unpersuasive. Undoubtedly, a waiter's
careless dropping of a plate is sometimes the product of unreason-
able risk-taking, but there is no reason to believe it always is. There
is no reason to believe that whenever someone injures another
through careless conduct, like dropping a plate, it is the result of an
unreasonable risk having been taken. If I trip walking down the
sidewalk, or if I aspirate my Diet Coke somewhat and choke, these
misperformances of mine are not necessarily products of risk-taking.
The waiter's dropping the soup is no different.
If one focuses enough on a risk-taking criterion, one might end up
thinking this cannot really be negligence.88 Perhaps when we call
the waiter careless, we are merely presuming he must have been
taking some risk; and perhaps conduct warranting such a presump-
tion counts as "careless" only by analogy to the presumed risk-
taking version, and thus is not really negligent. But here we are
letting the tail of the theory wag the dog of the phenomena. A
waiter's clumsy dropping of a bowl of hot soup on a patron is
paradigmatic of negligence. So too is a driver's skidding off the road
into a pedestrian because the driver is failing to exercise his driving
skill at that moment. Both of these scenarios are well described as
accidents flowing from the defendant's carelessness.
87. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, U. PA. L. REV. 887, 896,
940-41 (1994).
88. See id.
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3. Spectrum of Care Levels
There is another reason to take seriously the idea that a defini-
tion of negligence in terms of "ordinary care" really means some-
thing that links up with the concept of ordinariness, rather than
being a shell that the Hand Formula is needed to fill. Actions based
on defendant's failure to take care toward plaintiff are not always
judged by the "ordinary care" standard. Tort law has other levels of
care, and coming to appreciate that these other levels exist, and
appreciating their meaning, sheds light on what the standard of
"ordinary care" means.
Recall that one of the seminal American negligence cases, Brown
v. Kendall, involved an appeal of a verdict against a defendant who
had waved a big stick in order to break up a dog fight but, in so
doing, unintentionally blinded the plaintiff in one eye.89 The jury
verdict was rendered against defendant on the basis of an instruc-
tion that defendant must lose unless he proved that he was using
extraordinary care. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
per Chief Justice Shaw, reversed, holding that plaintiff must be
required to bear the burden of proving lack of care; defendant may
not be required to prove care as an affirmative defense; and, more
importantly, the appropriate standard of care was "ordinary care,"
not "extraordinary care."90
The lower court in Brown was not unusual or inventive in
employing a standard of extraordinary care. Its theory was that
plaintiff proved a trespass vi et armis-arguably the trial court's
principal error, from which all others derived-against him by
defendant, and that defendant's defense lay in arguing that his
touching of plaintiff was done out of the necessity of breaking up the
dog fight.9' This affirmative defense, under the trial judge's
plausible interpretation of the common law on this point, was very
demanding and required proof that defendant was using extraordi-
nary care.9 2
Even today, however, some jurisdictions and parts of tort law
permit plaintiff to win by demonstrating that defendant failed to
89. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 293 (1850).
90. Id. at 294, 296.
91. Id. at 294.
92. Id.
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live up to a quite stringently defined standard of care. A 1990
Pennsylvania case illustrates the point. In Jones v. Port Authority
of Allegheny County,93 plaintiff Jones fell and injured himself when
boarding a bus. Jones claimed that the bus started and stopped
before he could sit down, and that this caused him to be injured.94
The court held that the jury should be instructed that, because the
Port Authority was a common carrier, it is held to a different and
higher standard of care than persons are generally held to. Rather
than a standard of "ordinary care," the court explained, the
standard to which the Port Authority should be held is one requiring
"the highest degree of diligence and care in the (operation of its
vehicle) and the (maintenance of its equipment and facilities)."95
Jones's holding correctly characterizes the common law standard for
common carriers. Heightened standards have also applied, under
the common law, to bailors and to innkeepers and to certain other
enterprises of a public nature, on which consumers depend heavily
for their safety." The idea is that it is not good enough to use
ordinary care: they must exercise the highest degree of care.
Unsurprisingly, the law contains less demanding standards, too.
Famously, landowners at the common law had a. duty to licensees,
but the duty was quite narrow, far less than the duty of care owed
to invitees. As to licensees, landowners were obligated to refrain
from intentionally injuring them-presumably a reference to
intentional torts-and to inform them of hidden dangers that the
landowner knew of or should have known of, and that would not be
apparent to a reasonable licensee.97 And, of course, in some common
law contexts, and in a variety of statutory settings, the law creates
93. 583 A.2d 512, 513 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 514 (quoting, with approval, PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS).
96. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMINGJAMES, JR., THE LAW OFTORTS 945-54 (1956). At least
by the second edition, the treatise indicates that courts were generally repudiating the
differentiation of care levels and trying to squeeze these supposedly different roles under the
rubric of the reasonably prudent person. Id. at 945. However, notwithstanding the treatise's
evident preference for that route as a matter of theory and its reference to unanimity among
commentators against such differentiation, id. at 946 & n.13, it does in fact indicate the
continuing existence of this differentiation.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965).
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privileges or immunities that can be overcome only by a showing of
"gross negligence."98
These different varieties of care levels indicate that "ordinary
care" is an idea deliberately selected by our system. It refers to
something, albeit vaguely, and through the image of the reasonably
prudent person. It is not simply a shorthand way of connoting
optimal precaution taking.
4. Care Levels for Special Types of Relationships and
Professions
In professional malpractice and in torts involving children, the
standard of care is no longer that of the reasonably prudent person.
As for children, it is typically altered so as to refer to the reasonable
child of a particular age with the knowledge, skills, and judgment
of a child of that age."
For a physician, it is typically altered in two ways. First, as with
children, the prototype is the reasonable and competent physician
in that area. Second, the language is not simply "ordinary care"; a
physician is held to the standard of care for those in her field and
her community."° Again, in both instances, the breach standard in
negligence refers to a community norm of some form. Its meaning
does not contain anything whatsoever about balancing risks and
benefits, even if its application might do so.
5. Pairing with Duty
Finally, and in some ways most basically, "negligence" is ex-
pressly attached to the breach element of the cause of action for
negligence, along with three other elements: injury, duty, and
causation. The breach must be a breach of the duty to act with due
care. In most cases, "ordinary care" is the answer to a question:
What duty of care is due from defendant to plaintiff? "Ordinary
98. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 468-69 (Colo. 2004)
(recognizing that plaintiff may only recover in tort for the gross negligence of defendant if
plaintiff has signed an agreement waiving liability of defendant).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965).
100. Id. § 299A.
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care" is the duty that is owed to plaintiff by defendant in the run of
the mill case.
The central point is that a cause of action in negligence exists
only where the negligent conduct was a breach of a duty of defen-
dant not to act negligently to plaintiff or the class of persons to
which plaintiff belongs. This means that negligence cannot simply
be a failure to reject a risk that will lower total expected utility or
wealth. If there were a duty to comply with the Hand Formula, this
duty would not be relational: it would not be a duty to plaintiff or
the class of persons to which she belongs. It would be simply a duty,
without a relational quality. 1°1 But negligence law in fact has rich
relational duties. The form of breach that actually applies to
negligence law, therefore, must be such that we can think of it as
failing to use care toward plaintiff. The duty to use ordinary care
can be conceived of relationally in this manner: it is a matter of
taking ordinary care toward plaintiff. °2
B. What About Cases in Which the Hand Formula Is Used or
Could Be Used or Should Be Used?
Readers will be wondering how I can explain the fact that the
Hand Formula is used, that it seems to make some sense, that
famous judges have used it, that lawyers often use it to think
through what their legal theories will be and what to argue to
courts, and that English courts also appear to use some version of
balancing in many cases ° -Do these phenomena not cut against
the outright denial of the claim that the Hand Formula captures the
meaning of negligence law? Recall that this Article is not intended
to show that the Hand Formula is never used, or even to deny that
it is frequently used. Nor is it intended to show that the Hand
Formula should not sometimes be used or that the Hand Formula
is somehow immoral.
101. See Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO.
L.J. 585, 629-31 (2003) (noting the relational quality of tort law).
102. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 685 (2001).
103. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence
Law, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 489 (2002).
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First and foremost, a fact-finder who is asked what a reasonably
prudent person would have done under certain circumstances has
the right to think through that question however she wants,
assuming she is really thinking about that. Thus, if Richard Posner
were on a jury, trying to decide whether a defendant's conduct was
tortious, and he decided that a reasonably prudent person's conduct
would conform to the Hand Formula, he would be entitled to decide
breach questions by applying the Hand Formula. And of course, that
is what Judge Posner, sitting on the bench and reviewing breach
questions, sometimes does. Similarly, Judge Hand, in an admiralty
case like Carroll Towing, found the Hand Formula helpful in
deciding whether there was fault.' 4 As Stephen Gilles has recently
shown, many English judges use a similar balancing approach in
deciding whether ordinary care was taken in negligence cases. °5
I have argued above that it would not follow from the choice of
fact-finders to use the Hand Formula on some occasions that this is
the meaning of the Hand Formula, but the question still arises why,
if the meaning is something else, the Hand Formula is ever used.
The answer requires us to notice that, although negligence law
contains many cases like the Waiter and Driver hypotheticals, 10 6 it
contains many other cases that are the opposite. These are cases
with the following attributes: (1) the defendant makes a deliberative
choice to act without taking some precaution, and (2) fact-finders do
not come equipped with any solid judgments about whether a
reasonably careful person under such circumstances would have
behaved this way. At least under such circumstances-and perhaps
under others, too--the fact-finder needs a way into thinking about
what ordinary care would require.
My own inclination is to think that a widely shared but highly
amorphous norm of ordinary care is that a person deliberating over
what precautions to take in a practical scenario of first impression
ought to consider many different factors. These factors might
include what precautions are available; how feasible or time-
consuming or expensive these precautions are; whether physical
injury or property damage or some other kinds of loss are at risk for
104. See supra notes 40-42, 46-56 and accompanying text.
105. Gilles, supra note 103.
106. See supra Part II.A.2.
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the failure to take such precautions; in whom, in how many people,
and to what extent the degree of risks exists without precautions;
what range of precautions ought to be considered; how each of those
would diminish or alter the risks; and whether one can reframe the
issue so the dangerous activity does not need to go forward, if it is
dangerous. Of equal importance, I think our norms of ordinary care
would look to whether law, regulation, or professional or institu-
tional standards would require some precautions, whether doing so
is the custom, and whether anything has been said about it or
others have relied upon it. These norms would also look to whether
an understanding exists that such precaution is not being taken, or
whether there has been notice of or public awareness regarding the
particular risks in question. Surely, there are other factors, too.
In some contexts, this latter group of factors will probably not
have much weight to carry. Here, versions of feasibility and burden
of precautions, magnitude, extent, and nature of potential losses;
various ranges of probability and risk alterations garnered by each
potential precaution; and the possibilities of replacing the activity
altogether will certainly constitute a large part of the decision of
what reasonable prudence requires. In this type of scenario,
therefore, the Hand factors should, and probably will, play a
substantial role in thinking about whether there has been negli-
gence. But that is not because it is what negligence means. Rather it
is a subsidiary norm of reasonable prudence in a certain kind of
scenario that one ought to take these considerations into account.
Note also that, even in this scenario, the fact of utilizing the Hand
factors does not bring us to the Hand Formula, let alone a Posnerian
economic analysis, even as a matter of what is to be thought
through (leaving apart meaning). At least three reasons explain
why. First, everything does not clearly fall into burden, probability,
or loss. Economists, Heidi Hurd, and Michael Moore have made this
point; the three factors are too few to capture this.1 °7 My own
inclination is that the norm of deliberation that reasonable pru-
dence requires is probably even more complex. Second, the balanc-
ing metaphor can be interpreted in various ways; as the aggregative
version, which approximates what an act utilitarian would use to
107. Hurd & Moore, supra note 14, at 360-65 (describing an expansion of Hand Formula
into eight-factor analysis).
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evaluate the rightness of action, there is no reason to believe it
captures what our norms of ordinary care require. Arthur Ripstein
and Gregory Keating have spelled out what a Rawlsian version
might look like.1"8 As Stephen Gilles and Heidi Feldman have
shown, Henry Terry's classic article on negligence does not contem-
plate a utilitarian-style aggregation, but is in fact a more pluralistic
value inquiry that is not quite aggregative. 1°9 Third, there is no
suggestion here that there is a single metric of value that is being
maximized.
In some scenarios again, it would arguably comply with a norm
of being reasonably careful to adopt a single metric and to adopt an
aggregative analysis. For example, in Rhode Island Hospital Trust
National Bank v. Zapata Corp.,"' then-Judge Breyer used an
economic version of the Hand Formula in a banking case. The
question was whether a bank used ordinary care to ascertain
customers' check forgeries. The bank argued that its policy of
random checking was reasonable, and it showed that the policy was
far cheaper and only marginally less effective than--or perhaps as
effective as-a system that looked at every check.' Affirming a
District Court judge, and using the Hand Formula and cost-benefit
analysis, Judge Breyer agreed with the bank. The financial burden
of examining each check's signature was not warranted by the
reduction of risk of forgeries, under the Hand Formula." 2 But note
that the choice of an economic metric here was appropriate because
of the nature of the interests at stake. And the aggregative method
was appropriate because the bank customers-like the plaintiff in
the case-would bear much of the increased cost of forgery-detec-
108. Keating's and Ripstein's forms of Rawlsian tort theory have substantial differences.
Though Ripstein apparently believes a Rawlsian framework will illuminate the standard of
care, and will involve accommodations of liberty and security, he does not appear to believe
that a Rawlsian version of the Hand Formula is an important heuristic for the fact-finder,
which is central to Keating's view. Compare Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility
and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1812 (2004), with Gregory C. Keating,
Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857,
1865 (2004).
109. See Feldman, supra note 20, at 1442-43; Gilles, On Determining Negligence, supra note
16, at 826-27.
110. 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988).
111. Id. at 294.
112. Id. at 295.
2007] 2025
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tion. There was thus little tension between the interests of the
defendant and of the plaintiff.
To review: the main point here is that considering the Hand
factors is a permissible method for fact-finders, and in some cases,
a norm of being reasonably careful may require us to do so. But this
is a substantive normative claim for a subcategory of cases-and in
any case, it is probably not the Hand Formula and certainly not the
Posnerian version. And as such, even where it may be workable, it
is not the meaning of the negligence standard.
III. WHY IT MATTERS WHETHER THE ANALYSIS OF NEGLIGENCE IS
ACCEPTED
If the Posnerian account of what negligence means is indefensi-
ble, that is something important to know in tort law and tort theory.
A fortiori, it would be important to know whether the Hand
Formula, as conceived by Judge Hand and many legal academics
today, fails to provide-indeed, fails to permit-an adequate account
of negligence.
This is for several reasons. First, Posner's theory of negligence
and the Hand Formula is probably the most widely understood
aspect of Posner's entire economic theory of tort law; it is emblem-
atic of that theory, and it is the aspect of his view most widely
communicated to law students. 113 Obviously, it matters if this
centerpiece is indefensible. More generally, the contention that the
Hand Formula captures the meaning of negligence is central to
generally instrumentalist and utilitarian conceptions of tort law.
Again, if this supposedly prime contention fails to be supportable,
that is significant.
Second, and relatedly, many instances of evaluation of various
aspects of tort law and tort policy tend to take as a theoretical
framework either a Posnerian economic framework or, at least, an
instrumentalist account of how negligence law works. Thus, for
example, economists evaluating strict liability regimes against
negligence regimes tend to assume that the Posnerian interpreta-
tion of the Hand Formula captures the liability regime of the tort of
negligence, and they tend to believe this based on the Posner/Hand
113. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, supra note 11, at 45-47.
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analysis.114 Because one has strong reason to believe this assump-
tion is false, the soundness of the analysis based on it is under-
mined. A particularly striking example of permitting the tail of the
Hand Formula to wag the dog of negligence law is seen in some
well-known work of Professor Kip Viscusi's; Viscusi infers from
empirical studies that demonstrate layperson non-Hand-like
judgments about negligence that permitting jurors to decide
negligence cases may be problematic."'
Third, both economic and noneconomic proponents of the Hand
Formula interpretation of the meaning of negligence find
incoherences at many points in tort law, and based on this interpre-
tation they argue for the modification of tort law. If, as I have
argued, these interpretations are unsound, then the normative
argument for modification of these pieces of doctrine is unsound. Of
course, there may be other reasons for the modifications, so the
modifications may themselves be salutary. But if they are recom-
mended based largely on the misunderstanding of negligence, then
there is a problem; modification proposals will need serious
reexamination.
A long list of proposed modifications fit this description. Indeed,
many of the features of negligence law that showed the
inappositeness of the Hand Formula have been used by Posnerians
and instrumentalists more generally as reasons for modification of
the tort law. Thus, for example, some scholars recommend reforma-
tion of jury instructions to include the Hand Formula." 6 Many
scholars reject a description of the difference between plaintiffs
negligence and defendant's negligence." 7 The law defining standard
of care applicable to common carriers, for example, has been
different from ordinary care, but courts have not known what to do
with it, and so have sought to eliminate these different standards."'
And, as Goldberg and I have argued at length, a Hand Formula
conception of breach has led twentieth-century scholars to favor a
114. A. Mitchell Polinsky& Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REv. 869, 883 n.3 (1998).
115. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001). This is not to say that Hand-based or economic accounts of tort law
could not credit the role of juries. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 101, at 606-08.
116. Gilles, On Determining Negligence, supra note 16, at 856.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 (2000).
118. See Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1998).
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nonrelational conception of duty and has, therefore, led to an
abandonment of duty as carrying any weight." 9 All of these features
of negligence law, and many others too, are on the agenda of the
Third Restatement and other scholars as places for basic modifica-
tion of tort law. 2 0 To emphasize, my claim is not that these proposed
changes must be rejected; it is rather that they are misconceived
and unjustified insofar as they purport to derive from concerns
about the cogency of negligence law.
Finally, the contention that reasonable prudence designates the
Hand Formula in the history of American tort law is frequently used
not only to defend various policy proposals and doctrinal and
theoretical claims, but also to defend moral and legal claims about
how various agents should act. A longstanding and important
debate exists over how actors should figure harms and risks to
others into their decisionmaking; the debate is particularly pro-
tracted as to large corporate actors. Economists and noneconomists
alike have pointed to the putative fact that the law of negligence
puts the Hand Formula at its epicenter as a justification in favor of
a certain kind of approach.' 2 ' Typically, it is used as justification for
the appropriateness of aggregative cost-benefit analysis in corporate
decisionmaking. Again, whether such analysis ought to be used in
corporate decisionmaking, and if so, how, are difficult normative
questions that I am not addressing here. But it should be obvious
that the meaning of negligence in negligence law provides no
support for this claim. The idea that it does is yet another sleight of
Hand.
119. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 102, at 708.
120. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: LIABILITYFORPHYSICALHARM§ 3 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2001).
121. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 1013, 1037-38
(1991).
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IV. CANVASSING ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF THE CONTENT OF
NEGLIGENCE
A. Methodological Preliminaries
If the economic theory of the meaning of negligence is false, and
even the more general Hand standard theory of negligence is false,
what theory is true?
First, why do we need a theory? We do need to describe what the
law of negligence is, and we do need to be able to say enough about
the meaning of negligence for lawyers and jurors and judges to work
with, and for lawyers to advise clients on in counseling. It is not
obvious that the law, without theory, is inadequate to these tasks.
I am not so sure we do need a theory, but let us talk about why
having one might be helpful. Law professors want to be able to
explain negligence law to their students. Theory is helpful for that.
Also, our courts sometimes have to extend parts of negligence law,
and our courts-and legislatures-should often be evaluating parts
of negligence law. Understanding tort law at a more theoretical
level should help us in the justificatory and evaluative enterprise.
And it should help us decide whether we think the law is sound.
Notice, however, that thinking through these rationales for looking
for a theory might well have implications for the sort of theory one
wants and the urgency-or lack thereof--of producing one. Let us
leave these questions to one side, and survey the possibilities for a
theory going forward.
B. Right, Convention, and Virtue
Three alternative theories of the meaning of negligence have been
offered by tort theorists in recent years: rights-based thinking,
virtue ethics, and conventionalism. I shall suggest briefly in what
follows that, although each has something important to add to
thinking about the meaning of negligence, none provides a complete
theoretical framework.
The most prominent alternative to utilitarian theories of norma-
tive ideas, within both moral theory generally and interpretive legal
theories in particular, have been rights-based and deontological
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theories in the spirit of Kant. 122 Somewhat confusingly, rights-based
notions in tort theories have been merged, variously, with
Aristotelean corrective justice theories,12 Rawlsian fairness-based
contractarianism,'24 Strawsonian constructivist theories of responsi-
bility, "' and a variety of other views. Thankfully, we need not enter
into this territory, because our question is not about the structure
of an entire tort theory. It is about the theory of the meaning and
content of the standard of care in negligence law. On this point, I
believe, there is more harmony among rights-based theorists.
Rights theorists as diverse as Gregory Keating,'26 Arthur
Ripstein, 27 Ernest Weinrib,'28 and Richard Wright'29 seem to agree
upon the following, frankly Kantian, view: individuals are entitled,
as a matter of political morality, to a substantial level of respect and
vigilance for their physical integrity-as well as their property. The
standard of care of negligence law is best understood as an effort to
capture this moral idea. The standard requires that risks not be
taken to someone's physical integrity that are inconsistent with that
level of respect and vigilance. The fact that great benefits for others,
or for oneself, might flow from taking substantial risks to a person
or small group of persons cannot justify the taking of that risk. In
this sense, the rights-based notion exemplifies the Kantian injunc-
tion against treating persons as means, the Rawlsian respect for the
separateness of persons, and the Dworkinian notion of rights as
"trumps."' 0 That is, the rights-based analysis of the content of the
standard of care in negligence law claims that this standard
exemplifies these ideas, a claim that appears to be-and, I believe,
is-inconsistent with the Hand standard analysis of reasonable care
as interpreted by Posner.
122. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICE 207-36 (1970).
123. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 58-66, 114-44 (1995).
124. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 13, at 318-21.
125. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449,
500-02 (1992).
126. Keating, supra note 13, at 312-13.
127. Ripstein, supra note 108, at 1832-33.
128. WEINRIB, supra note 123, at 114-44.
129. Wright, supra note 8, at 145-46.
130. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 175-82 (1971).
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The rights-based theorists, of course, recognize that risks must be
taken if life is to go on, and they take seriously the idea of reason-
able care-as opposed to all possible care, for example. But rather
than aggregate the benefits of the risk and weigh them against the
probable losses, as a utilitarian or a Posnerian would, the rights-
based theorists imagine that the reasonable care standard must
respect the right to physical integrity while simultaneously
respecting an adequate sphere of liberty of conduct: to overempha-
size risk is to undercut the right to act. And so the standard of care,
at least as a matter of principle, is an objective constraint that
recognizes every person's equal right to have his or her bodily
integrity respected without being foreclosed from a proper sphere of
liberty of conduct. Although this resembles the Posnerian/Hand
standard because it accommodates both the need for action and the
need to be free of harm, it differs because it does not aggregate well-
being. It recognizes the separateness of persons. It is not based on
preferences, but on bodily integrity as a primary good; it is similarly
based on basic but nonpreference-based notions of proper spheres of
liberty and equal treatment of all. Weinrib, Wright, Ripstein, and
Keating have each provocatively suggested doctrinal differences
that the rights-based notion of negligence might make, both
descriptively and prescriptively."'3
Patrick Kelley's conventionalist account of the content of negli-
gence law seizes on several features of negligence law that are
clearly quite important to the institutional entrenchment of tort
law.'32 First and foremost, the language of negligence law and, as
Kelley and Wendt have shown in the research that I referred to
above, the language of jury instructions, use the word "ordinary" in
setting out the standard of care. 3' "Ordinary" connotes "what is
done" and what is "usual." Kelley asserts that negligence law
envisions community standards of care, ones to which the relevant
community conventionally adheres. The standard to which defen-
dants are held is the care level that is conventional within the
relevant community."3 4 In American negligence law, Kelley suggests,
the function of a jury, which is a cross-section of the community, is
131. See supra notes 126-29.
132. Kelley, supra note 15.
133. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 595.
134. Kelley, supra note 15, at 381.
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to evaluate what the conventional community standard of care is
and to ascertain whether the defendant has lived up to it.' 3 ' Jurors
are fact-finders on breach precisely because they are well equipped
to tap into the conventions of care extant in the community.
Heidi Feldman's "prudence"-based account of the standard of care
is different from both the rights-based and conventionalist
accounts.'36 Though the conventionalist account seizes on the
centrality of the social phenomenon of convention, and the language
of "ordinary care," the prudence-based account focuses on the
individual/moral concept of the virtue of the prudent person and the
language of the "reasonably prudent" person.'37 Feldman suggests
that negligence law envisions a person with the moral virtue of
prudence and defines the standard of care by reference to that
person.'38 Building on a rich literature in moral philosophy and
moral psychology that revitalized virtue theorists of Arisotelean
moral philosophy, Feldman offers a twist on the rights-theorists' use
of moral theory. Like them, she suggests that an adequate interpre-
tation of the duty of reasonable care cannot be obtained without
drawing from moral theory; unlike them, she rejects deontology in
favor of virtue theory, at least for the understanding of what the
standard in care of negligence law requires. 3 s
Each of these kinds of theory merits greater attention than space
permits. My point here is not to refute them but merely to suggest
reasons to be concerned about their adequacy and reasons to look for
an alternative. Rights-based theories are insufficiently attentive to
extant social norms, poorly suited to explain jury competency, and
unlikely able to explain why they should be able to illuminate the
centrally important idea of what "ordinary care" requires and the
pervasive normative incrementalism of negligence law. Convention-
alism, by contrast, has the opposite problem: although well-suited
to jury competency and attentive to social norms, it leaves juror
normativity out of the picture, but leaves insufficient room for the
T.J. Hooper rule that custom is not dispositive of standard of care.' 40
135. Id. at 380.
136. Feldman, supra note 20.
137. Id. at 1432-33.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Of equal importance, conventionalist accounts do not adequately
explain the central role of the prototype of the reasonably prudent
person, and they do not explain how the reasonably prudent person
standard can function if community convention does not offer any
decisive answer.
In many respects, the virtue theory overcomes the problems of the
prior two approaches. It is particularly promising because it gives
a central role to the concept of a reasonably prudent person, and it
selects for the standard of care concept one that relates to a family
of concepts that puts an exemplar of some attribute in a position to
provide content for the concept more generally. Moreover, although
it builds in normativity, it leaves much more space for explaining
the incrementalist judgments and circumstance-based evaluation
than the rights-based approach does. A fundamental problem of the
virtue approach, as Kelley and Wendt have anticipated, is that
virtues are excellences, and the concept of ordinary care is some-
thing much less high-reaching than an excellence.'41 It is also
unclear whether jury competency and the relevance of social norms
will be adequately handled by the virtue theory.
V. ORDINARY CARE: A CIL COMPETENCY THEORY
Can these diverse theoretical strands be woven together in a
manner that captures the concept of negligence? Perhaps. I will
leave to another occasion the effort to construct such a theory in any
detail. Here I will simply try to suggest why I am optimistic about
such a synthesis.
As the foregoing indicates, in certain respects Feldman's virtue-
based view is remarkably well-suited to account for the idea of
negligence, but in other respects it is the opposite. It is extremely
promising insofar as it takes seriously the idea that negligence is to
be understood in connection with a kind of exemplar of reasonable
prudence; it is disappointing insofar as it tries to connect that
exemplar with the excellences of virtue theory. Similarly, conven-
tion theories are promising insofar as they take seriously the
connotation of "ordinariness," as well as the significance of social
norms. They are disappointing insofar as they try to lock the
141. Kelley & Wendt, supra note 15, at 621-22.
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meaning of negligence into a depiction of compliance with custom.
Finally, rights-based theories are promising insofar as they take
relational duties seriously, recognize that due care can sometimes
have a kind of prioritization, and treat certain kinds of needs of
others as demanding special attention. The theory is unpersuasive,
however, because it depends too highly on the legal decision makers'
exercise of moral judgment and leaves too little room for
circumstance-bound, custom-bound judgments of degree.
A plausible synthesis of these would link the strengths of all
three. Thinking about negligence, as Feldman indicates, involves
reference to a certain kind of figure whom we imagine. 142 This
figure-the reasonably prudent person-has a quality of reasonable
prudence, and exercises that quality both in deliberation and in
execution. But the quality does not necessarily rise to the level of an
excellence or a virtue. On the contrary, it is a quality we each expect
of ourselves and of others. It is part of being well-socialized. It is a
baseline, not a pinnacle. Although reasonable prudence is valuable
for oneself, it is clearly a quality from a social point of view, too. And
its absence-negligence, or the lack of reasonable prudence-is a
shortcoming insofar as it is an enduring feature of someone. More
to the point, however, when someone acts in a manner that does not
display reasonable prudence, the action is to that degree criticizable.
That is what we call negligence.
What does reasonable prudence consist in? In part, it consists in
diligence. More broadly, the quality of being reasonably prudent is
to a significant extent a form of social or civil competency. A society
socializes its members to be honest and truthful and reliable. It also
socializes its members to be careful. The reasonably prudent person
is a reasonably careful person. As conventionalist theorists have
pointed out, according to some social norms one is expected to
constrain one's risky activities so as to diminish the risks to others.
The quality of being a reasonably prudent person is the quality of
being a person who competently negotiates and complies with those
norms. But just as the virtue of honesty is not wholly captured by
the idea of complying with norms of truth-telling, so the idea of
reasonable prudence is not captured by compliance with these
conventions. Just as honesty is an underlying character attribute
142. See generally Feldman, supra note 20.
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that rises above compliance with some norm or another, so reason-
able prudence is an underlying attribute that rises above one rule
or another of being careful.
To some extent, the activity of driving illustrates the concept of
competency I have in mind. Being a reasonably careful driver is
certainly a kind of competency. The competency here combines skill,
socialization, and compliance with certain conventions, as well as
law. It is tenable to conceive of judgments of negligence in connec-
tion with the competent driver under the circumstances. Occasions
of negligent driving certainly occur even with competent drivers; the
question, in a negligence case involving a defendant's driving, is not
whether the driver herself was competent, but whether the allegedly
negligent conduct was prototypical of the competent driver. As
thinkers from Henry Terry to Heidi Feldman have pointed out,143
negligence is a concept we utilize by referring to this prototypical
figure.
In another respect, however, the competency of drivers is too thin
to explain the concept of the reasonably prudent person. Like the
surgeon, the driver is an important example for thinking about care
in the executive scenario; of the pairing "reasonably careful" and
"reasonably prudent," driving works particularly well for "reason-
ably careful." It works less well with "reasonably prudent," because
prudence makes avoiding the difficult challenge of explaining the
deliberative aspect of negligence harder. Here, the notion of
competence-at least if interpreted in terms of skill, socialization,
and compliance with convention-falls short of capturing "pru-
dence."
What is interesting about both the virtue conceptions of prudence
and the social norms regarding prudent conduct is that they do not
simply relate to skill or performance; they relate also to the very
activity of taking others' well-being seriously in conducting oneself.
A reasonably prudent camper at a public campground in the
wilderness, for example, would put out her fire before leaving her
campsite; this is a matter of socialization, skill, and convention. But
the reasonably prudent camper would also not leave trash or debris
that included bits of meat at her campground after she left, rules or
no rules. She would be alert to the risk of attracting wild animals,
143. See Feldman, supra note 20, at 1442-43 (quoting Terry, supra note 65, at 261,263-64).
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and to the risk this presented to other campers after she left. Part
of being reasonably prudent, under such circumstances, is being
able to think through an appropriate way to behave that does not
unduly imperil others. And this is not simply a question of skill or
intelligence or foresight, though it frequently involves these. A
person who is skillful, intelligent, and capable of reasonable
foresight might nevertheless not even consider the risk to others of
leaving trash with meat, or, if she thought of it, might not care.
Reasonable prudence here involves being other-regarding to a
certain extent.
Deontological accounts of reasonable care begin to capture the
other-mindedness that goes into reasonable prudence, or the
reasonable prudence of our common law of negligence. So, too, do
virtue accounts of prudence. But the deontological account comes
closer to capturing the idea of a baseline, rather than an excellence.
The concept of "reasonable" prudence is not, to repeat, an excel-
lence. It is an idea of a satisfactory or adequate level of prudence,
and in this context, it means an adequate consideration of others. So
my own view would be, in the trash-with-bits-of-meat case, that
there is no question that one should not leave the trash, and it
would be imprudent to do so. But if this were a tort action after a
bear drawn to the campsite mauled those in the tent near the
garbage, putting duty questions aside, I think it would probably be
a jury issue on the question of ordinary care, because ordinary care
is not all that high a standard.
Is this really a concept of competency, even if it also includes both
the intellectual capacity and the moral disposition to constrain one's
conduct in order not to cause harm to others? Does it not beg the
question of the desirability of this attribute to call it a "compe-
tency"? One need not be a conventionalist or some kind of moral
realist to suppose that it is a concept of a certain kind of person. It
is perfectly cogent to suppose the following: our tort system invites
fact-finders to make judgments on conduct by asking them to
compare the conduct to a prototype of a kind of person, and that
kind of person is an amalgam of a set of abilities, skills, dispositions
to satisfy certain social conventions, and dispositions to take
possible injuries to others seriously in their deliberations and their
conduct. That is, indeed, precisely what the common law of negli-
gence appears to do.
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The concept of reasonable prudence as a competency, rather than
a virtue, is the idea that the shortcoming of negligent conduct
should be conceived as conduct that deviates from what may be
expected of an ordinary citizen in society. The concept is derivative
of a kind of character, but a character that we envision as good
enough, not great. Part of being good enough-being competent as
a member of society-is being sufficiently other-minded that one's
conduct and one's dispositions are adjusted to not harming others.
More particularly, part of being competent as a member of society
is complying with an obligation to others to temper one's conduct so
as not to injure them. What is that scope of the obligation to others
to temper one's conduct so as not to injure them? The answer-
ordinary care-takes us back to the reasonably prudent person. But
that is just to say that the answer is, to a certain degree, "like this";
it involves conceiving of a prototypical figure, and how she or he
would behave.
A civil competency theory of the standard of care promises many
advantages. Most obviously, it genuinely captures the language
used in jury instructions, for it is structured around the idea of a
care level that we expect of one another in society and that-as Lord
Alderson suggested-such a level of competency involves being
"guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs."44 Because it is designed to capture the
concept of reasonable prudence as something less than a virtue, but
nevertheless a commendable attribute of an ordinary socialized
person, it is also apt to capture the idea of "ordinary care." And
because it is designed around a prototype, there is reason to think
it can admit of incremental judgment, and accommodate the notion
of a thought experiment in which a juror contemplates the reason-
ably prudent person under the circumstances.
Second, the civil competency notion is entirely comfortable with
both inadvertence and advertence in negligence. Insofar as it draws
upon an idea of competency in skill and execution, it makes room for
the inadvertence. But because civil competency also requires an
attitude of taking others seriously, and a capacity to work through
decisions with that attitude, it also handles cases of advertence.
144. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 156 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1049.
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Third, nothing is odd about the idea that, in some contexts, tort
law might set the standard of care higher than that of a person with
what I have called civil competency. Those who are involved in
highly dangerous enterprises, with which they are better acquainted
than their customers or consumers, with which they are better able
to take precautions, from which they profit, and in whom trust is
placed, might plausibly be held to go beyond what we require of one
another merely as a matter of competency. Relatedly, it is perfectly
cogent for courts to think about higher and lower degrees of care.
Lower degrees of care, for example, may be proper if it is desirable
to constrict liability for policy reasons, and yet to leave a modicum
of liability where particularly egregious conduct just short of
intentionality is involved; here, gross negligence is significantly
below a failure to comply with the conduct of an ordinary person
who diligently and competently conducts herself. Similarly, higher
degrees of care may be proper for professionals and those who
undertake highly risky enterprises. Such people are relied upon to
exercise abilities and skills, and utilize knowledge, far above what
is a matter of being a diligent, socialized, and civil adult operating
as such.
In the fourth place, a civil competency notion of negligence leaves
room for a relational conception of duty in a way that the Hand
Formula does not. For the question arises as to who is within the
ambit of persons to whom a duty of vigilance is owed. The failure to
take care not to inflict injury upon another is not actionable by that
other unless there was a duty running to that person or the class of
persons to which she belongs. Underlying the value of taking care
is the fact that one is taking care not to injure others; conversely,
the actionability of a victim's injury by a tortfeasor depends upon
the tortfeasor's having failed to take the care owed to her. As argued
above and elsewhere, 145 this makes no sense on a Hand Formula
conception of negligence. On the notion sketched above, it does
make sense; part of the nature of the civil competency is taking
seriously, and integrating into the guidance of one's behavior, the
possibility of injury to others and the need to avoid that. The
"others" are not an amorphous mass of possible injury victims, but
an overlap of individuals and classes of individuals whom the civilly
145. See supra Part II.A.
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competent person recognizes--or should recognize-as beneficiaries
of her prudence. The claim here is not that a notion of civil compe-
tency in and of itself precludes a nonrelational conception of duty-I
believe Holmes's conception of negligence may indeed have been a
nonrelational civil competency notion. The claim is that a Hand
Formula conception precludes a cogent relational conception, but a
civil competency notion does not.
It is important to note that the civil competency notion of
negligence does not preclude acceptance, in certain scenarios, of a
risk/benefit balancing norm as a norm that the reasonably prudent
person would utilize, or would guide her conduct under novel
circumstances in which decisions had to be made about precaution
levels. Plainly, a juror or judge could adopt such a framework in
thinking about how a defendant ought to have conducted himself.
But this is not a matter of what "negligence" or "ordinary care" or
"reasonable prudence" means, but what, under certain kinds of
circumstances, it might require. From a few academic thinkers in
the early twentieth century, through Richard Posner, to innumera-
ble torts professors today, the allure of the risk/benefit balancing as
a norm of prudence has been sufficiently powerful to obscure from
sight the fact that negligence is about a more basic idea of using
ordinary care, an idea that has content and structure of its own.
Finally, a civil competency notion of ordinary care promises more
than a better doctrinal account of negligence law. As John Goldberg
and I have argued in response to Calabresi's The Costs of Acci-
dents-ironically, Posner's own target-a theory of the common law
of torts ought to be able to explain in what sense tort law is
integrated into the practices and mores of social life;'4 6 this is part
of what tort law is as a form of common law. This should go beyond
Calabresi's efforts to depict tort law as something other than
command-and-control. To his credit, Posner strove to do just that in
this own theory of negligence law, trying to explain in what sense
both judges and actors were, in what we regard as a highly improba-
ble mix of Hegel, Holmes, and Adam Smith, driven toward a set of
customary behaviors that tends toward efficiency.'47 For reasons
146. See CALABRESI, supra note 26; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REv. 364, 395 (2005).
147. See Posner, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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explained here and elsewhere, that picture is not, at the end of the
day, plausible.
A civil competency notion points in the right direction. Negligence
law is not best understood as standing on its own two feet as a
device for deterrence and compensation. It is best understood as an
institutionalized, proceduralized, rule-bound set of norms and
powers that play a complementary role to a broader set of social
practices, norms, and social mores. We understand one another as
bound to conduct ourselves with a level of care toward others; we
understand ourselves as owed such care by others. Insofar as we are
players in a mutual social enterprise of activities in a civil society,
that enterprise requires a level of maturity, competency, and
considerateness in our activities. The reasonably prudent person is
such a player, created through education, socialization, and
convention, and supported by the law. Part and parcel of the idea
that such mutual care is a basic expectation of one another is the
idea that to injure someone through failing to take such care is to
wrong that person. That is the wrong of negligence. Because the
actionable wrongs of negligence law are in this manner intertwined
with what we expect of one another, what we take to be "those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs,"'48 negligence law and social norms of responsibility play a
mutually enforcing role.
CONCLUSION
Learned Hand's famous opinion in Carroll Towing intelligently
finessed a tricky question in an admiralty case by demonstrating
that the standards for proper care of one's barge would have to
vary with circumstances.'49 Ever attracted by the appearance of
analytical clarity, Hand advanced his argument by briefly suggest-
ing an algebraic inequality: is B < PL? None of this should have
been particularly controversial, nor was it when this relatively
unimportant case was decided in 1944. During the 1950s and 1960s,
however, tort law underwent a massive change, in which the
concept of negligence fell into deep disfavor among leading academ-
148. Blyth, 156 Eng. Rep. at 1049.
149. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
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ics. In part for political reasons, in part for economic reasons, and
in part because of the dim view that academic thinkers in law and
social science took of ordinary moral vocabulary, the moral connota-
tions of "negligence" drove leading tort scholars to doubt the very
idea and structure of a law of negligence.8 °
Into this environment entered Richard Posner-lawyer, not
economist---evidently displaying somewhat different political
leanings than those, like Calabresi, who pushed toward a regime of
strict liability. 1 ' Posner asked whether negligence law really was a
formless charade, whether the concept of negligence was merely an
emotive shell covering incoherence. When it was written, A Theory
of Negligence was intended to provide an emphatic "no" in answer
to that question. 52 Drawing upon the legendary Learned Hand, and
taking central provisions from the First and Second Restatements
of Torts, Posner reinvigorated the notion that "negligence" meant
something and that negligence law hung together as a coherent
whole. He did this by making the Hand Formula the core of
negligence."'
Unfortunately, Posner's utilization of the Hand Formula turns
out to be indefensible sleight of hand, as I have called it."M But this
is not to say that he was wrong about the cogency of negligence law;
he was right about that, albeit for the wrong reasons. Negligence
law is, as it purports to be, about ordinary care. Ironically, the
challenge of accounting for ordinary care turns out to be, in many
ways, greater than the challenge of generating an account friendlier
to expert conceptions of care owed. But we should be encouraged by
the fact that, if a genuine account of ordinary care can be con-
structed, we will have done what we need to do without venturing
into the territory of abstract moral theory. And we will have done so
without sleight of hand.
150. See Posner, supra note 10, at 29-32.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See supra Part II.
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